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Abstract
Modern theories attach much attention to interest rate-related problems. We discuss the impacts of the interest rate
liberalization, in China, for ten commercial banks of three markedly different ownership types. The methodology is based
on revisited interest rate sensitivity analysis, duration analysis and value-at-risk analysis. The situation is examined within
both vertical (composition of operating income and interest rate sensitivity gap for the ten banks in the same year) and
horizontal (one bank over a 7-year period) aspects. Thereafter, we discuss the present management of interest rate risks by
such banks. We conclude with several suggestions on how such commercial banks risk management can be refocused and
on how their cases can be used for comforting other banking cases.
Keywords Risk management  Commercial banks  Different ownership types  Interest rate sensitivity analysis 
Duration gap analysis  Value-at-risk analysis  Horizontal and vertical aspects
1 Introduction
Interest rate is one of the most crucial economic variables
in economics (Dell’Ariccia et al. 2014). In modern econ-
omy, interest rate is regarded as the price of capital,
quoting $https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/intere
strate.asp$ ‘‘being the amount a lender charges for the use
of assets expressed as a percentage of the principal. The
interest rate is typically noted on an annual basis known as
the annual percentage rate (APR).’’ Its fluctuations not only
have a great impact upon capital market and monetary
markets, but also influence the whole economy (Drakos
et al. 2016). As a result, modern economists attach a great
importance to interest rate-related problems. Moreover,
governments also take interest rate as one of the most
important tools toward macroeconomic regulation and
control; at the same time, the authorities put massive
emphasis on interest rate and its risk management.
Furthermore, quoting $https://www.quora.com/What-
does-liberalization-of-interest-rates-mean$, ‘‘liberalization
of interest rates is the process by which a monetary
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authority relinquishes some control of setting or manipu-
lating interest rates; hence, allowing market forces to
mostly determine interest rates. Note: liberalization of
interest rates does not necessarily mean the complete
absence of interest rates regulations; it simply means
monetary authorities have decided to loosen their grip a
little bit.’’
As a significant revolution, interest rate liberalization
enables the capital in the market to provide some optimal
arrangement which largely promotes the development of a
country economy. However, interest rate liberalization also
brings huge challenges and risks to the banking industry
(Dell’Ariccia et al. 2014).
As for China, a planned economic system has been going
on for decades. The interest rate is controlled by the Central
Bank, i.e., People’s Bank of China. Since 1996, an interest
rate liberalization has been going on through several sig-
nificant reforms which gradually deregulated inter-bank
offered rates, bond repurchase rates, foreign currency lend-
ing rates, large amount of foreign currency deposit interest
rates and financial institutions lending rates. Besides, the
People’s Bank of China (PBC) increased the frequency of
adjusting benchmark interest rates. In its Annual Report
PBC 2007–2014, the interest rate is continuously observed
to increase six times in 2007 and decrease in 2008 thereafter.
The interest rate increased three times in 2011 and decreased
three times from 2012 to 2014. In addition, PBC succes-
sively adjusted the benchmark interest rates eight times from
2010 to 2014. Thus, this is one signal of China fastening the
pace of interest rate liberalization. At this point, it is highly
significant for commercial banks to follow the tendency.
However, more importantly, enhancing commercial banks
level of managing interest rate risks should be highly valued
by managers.
Our subsequent analysis is based on data analysis fol-
lowing the reform of interest rate, so-called, liberalization.
The literature review is found in Sect. 2, enticing the focus
of the intended research, illuminated in Sect. 3 through a
set of paragraphs ‘‘methodology,’’ in view of the pertinent
subsequent analysis.
We aim at analyzing the past situation of Chinese banks
and their management of interest rate risks in Sect. 4 at a
theoretical level and specifically studying the case of ten
Chinese commercial banks in Sect. 5. We stress that we
consider different types of ownership, as found in PRC, a
distinction also appropriate in various economies around
the world.
We conclude with suggestions in Sect. 6. A few
appendices contain tables with data. Thus, this research
puts forward presently relevant open questions for which
we hopefully provide a few answers.
In brief, one has to know how to measure risk, in the
context of APR, whence how to find how banks can
(theoretically and practically) manage such a risk, and
specifically, how various types of commercial banks in
China, the main ones, are influenced by government poli-
cies. Thus, the ‘‘research questions’’ read:
1. ‘‘How efficiently commercial bank interest rate risks
can be measured?’’
2. ‘‘How do changes in interest rates affect bank’s
performance/management?’’ Or ‘‘How do changes in
interest rate affect the income and profitability of the
banks?’’
3. ‘‘How can Chinese commercial banks improve their
risk management?’’ Or ‘‘How can the PRC monetary
authorities control the interest rate risk to improve the
Chinese banks risk management?’’
The answers to the questions, as found in Sects. 4 and 5,
are based on discussing interest rate sensitivity, duration
gap and value-at-risk. We apply the operating income
analysis method, the interest rate sensitivity gap analysis,
and the duration analysis for this empirical research on
‘‘interest rate risks management,’’ following the recent
‘‘interest rate liberalization,’’ in a still called ‘‘emerging
country,’’ China. To do so, ten commercial banks serve as
support of our discussion and arguments.
2 Literature review
Since 1662, the representatives of interest rate liberaliza-
tion theory include William Petty, John Locke and Dudley
North. Petty (1662) suggests that the demand and supply
determine the interest rate (Vaggi and Groenewegen 2016).
The same theory was approved by Locke (1692) in his
anonymous book (Hayek 2005). Specifically, Locke holds
the thought that interest rate is the price of monetary
capital; it is the same as other products prices to be decided
by demand and supply on a market. If the government tries
to control the interest rate by law and violates the objective
laws of capital flows, this causes chaos in an economy.
However, North (1691) regards currency and loaned capital
separately (Chisholm 1911): he thinks that the determina-
tion of interest rate is the demand and supply of loaned
capital; besides, the only way to adjust interest rate is the
market; a government intervention is invalid and only
breaks the economic operation. In his (though anonymous!)
tract, North points out that to decrease interest rate for
promoting economy by law or to increase interest rate for
excessive consumption is (alas, our word) done in vain.
Shaw (1973) mentioned financial deepening theory in
his famous book. From thereon, it has to be admitted that
for developing countries, long-term intervention, including
taking control of interest rates and exchange rates, would
lead to an unbalance situation for financial instruments,
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would narrow down the financial scale and restrict eco-
nomic development. In fact, many researchers agree that a
financial repression is no longer suitable for the current
economy, on the one hand, and governments should
gradually loosen up restrictions, so that to promote eco-
nomic growth, on the other hand. Besides, financial deep-
ening, the increased provision of financial services, could
stimulate investors. In so doing, they would enlarge their
investment so that to improve the allocation efficiency of
social capitals and eventually solve employment problems,
as well as economic output problems. In addition, positive
effects would also result from a fair competition for all
market anticipators, enforce the relationship between sup-
ply and demand, better control the interest rates, and pro-
mote the allocation of capital.
Disapproving financial repression, Fry (1980) has a
great contribution. He uses a sample of 61 developing
countries, for the period 1961–1975, in order to estimate
the cost ratio of some financial repression. He demonstrates
that the growth of actual deposit interest rates could only
have positive influences upon the economic development.
Through empirical research, he proves that, when the
actual deposit interest rate is 1% lower than the market
equilibrium interest rate, the cost of some financial
repression is about 0.5%. Therefore, the economy growth
would decrease 0.5%. Lanyi and Saracoglu (1983) agree
with Fry’s opinion. They take 21 developing countries for
their samples: data ranging from 1971 to 1980. The results
show that there is a positive relationship between the actual
interest rate and the actual increase rate of financial assets
as well as with the increase rate of GDP. Gelb (1989)
enlarges Lanyi and Saracoglus sample to 34 developing
countries. His empirical research proves that when the
actual interest rate increases by 1%, the economy would
increase from 0.2 to 0.6%. Notice that Roubini and Sala-i-
Martin (1992) argue that the former mentioned scholars
only take one factor into consideration while ignoring other
influencing factors and have done a binary regression on 53
countries’ cross-sectional data, nevertheless obtaining
similar results.
Recently, Papadamou and Siriopoulos (2014) hold the
opinion that the development of developing countries’
financial market is constrained because governments dis-
obey natural economy laws, leading to breaks in market
demand and supply, hence blocking economic develop-
ment. Moreover, Papadamou and Siriopoulos propose to
eliminate financial repression and release the control of
interest rate, so that one would reach true financial liber-
alization. That is to say, the interest rate would wholly
reflect the real demand and supply on a market, and as a
result, this would increase the market efficiency and
accelerate a rapid development of the economy. Briefly
concluding here, researchers who agree with a concept of
financial deepening (Shaw 1973), i.e., an increased ratio of
liquid money supply (to GDP or to some price index), all
prove that the growth of actual interest rates would result in
an increase of the economy. Additionally, the governments
should support financial liberalization by perfecting finan-
cial supervision and market mechanisms.
In contrast, Hellmann et al. (1997) hold the opposite
opinion. They propose the theory of financial restraint, in
which the financial restraints implemented by governments
could promote the development of a financial market and
reach economic growth. It can be stressed that the financial
deepening theory is not suitable for all areas. Take devel-
oped countries as examples. In order to get more cus-
tomers, it is common knowledge that the competition
among commercial banks becomes very severe day by day.
Under these circumstances, commercial banks take actions
to earn profits by any kind of means. This leads to vicious
competition and unsteadily influences the development of
the country economy.
To be more specific, for one thing, in order to maintain
the stable development of an economy, the government
would interfere with the interest rates evolution and keep
them at a relatively low level. Moreover, such a govern-
ment would restrict loan issuing. This attitude is considered
to be negative toward economic development. Therefore,
the passion of investors would go down as well. For an
interest rate low level, savings go down, while money
demand goes up; thus, debt increases. This leads to capital
demand exceeding supply. As a result, one would think that
the government would take actions to allocate limited
capitals. That is to say, under these conditions, the profits
of small- and medium-sized enterprises are lower than
those of state-owned enterprises; the former hardly attract
capital. In order to make profits, small- and medium-sized
enterprises have to be financed by (not supervised, some-
what illegal) private banks. This reduces the utilization
ratio of capitals leading to a negative influence on the
economy.
In such a frame of thought, one concludes that only
when the governments loosen up the restraint toward
financial sources and reach financial liberalization, can the
economy positively progress and one get rid of poverty.
In the framework of considerations upon interest rate
risk management, western scholars are fond of interest rate
sensitivity gap analysis, duration analysis, value-at-risk
(VaR) analysis, and dynamic simulation analysis. Let us
consider these, respectively.
The interest rate sensitivity gap (IRSG) is the balance
between interest rate sensitivity asset and interest rate
sensitivity liabilities; IRSG is applied for calculating the
influence upon interest rate changes toward net interest
incomes of banks.
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It is often suggested that banks would subjectively
adjust structure of assets and liabilities ahead of time in
order to adhere to the future (expected) trend of interest
rate in view of increasing the net interest income (Antoniou
et al. 2009; Duan et al. 1999; Kero 2013; Byun and Chang
2015).
Macaulay (1938) put forward the now called Macaulay
duration which combined coupon effect and horizon effect,
to measure the sensitivity of bond price changes toward
interest rate changes. In other words, Macaulay applies
weighted averages to calculate the average expiration time
of bonds. The duration can be applied not only to a single
bond, but also to the whole bond portfolio. Yet, there is no
so-called linear relation between bond price and its rate of
return. As a result, when interest rate massively changes,
the duration is unable to reflect the sensitivity of bond
changes toward interest rate changes. Therefore, he intro-
duces convexity, combining convexity and duration to
measure bonds interest rate risks.
The VaR (Jorion 1997) is used for quantizing risks:
under a certain confidence level, a single financial asset or
a portfolio would be in a great loss in the future. Nowa-
days, many foreign financial institutions apply VaR model
as their risk management tool.
For universal coherence, the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision has published regulations for interest
rate risk management. For instance, in 1996 (Basel Record
1996), the committee published 12 principles of interest
rate risk management. It emphasized that banks should
build up all-rounded interest rate risk management mech-
anism in order to effectively identify, measure and monitor
interest rate risk position. In 2004 (Basel Record II 2004),
the committee published another document on the princi-
ples of interest rate risk management and governance.
These principles were commonly summarizing many
international banks practice. They include the management
mechanism related to interest rate risk and solutions related
to bank interest rate risk. The principles in 2004 regulated
the measurement and management of commercial banks’
interest rate risks. Interest rate is here below considered to
have four major aspects: basis risk, yield curve risk,
repricing risk, and option risk.
‘‘Finally,’’ and more specifically with respect to our
study, different researchers have considered various
aspects of China when practicing an interest rate liberal-
ization. Several papers pertaining to ‘‘transition countries’’
can be considered here as also relevant by analogy.
Specifically, for China, Haselmann and Wachtel (2007)
analyzed the necessity of practicing interest rate liberal-
ization under an open economy perspective. They point out
four reasons for practicing an interest rate liberalization:
first of all, interest rate could automatically adjust and
stabilize the economy; secondly, the governments control
toward interest rate is invalid; thirdly, the current control of
interest rate has influenced the effective allocation of
domestic capital; and lastly, the control of interest rate is
adverse to Chinese balance of international payment.
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014) classify risks that probably
happened in Chinese interest rate risk liberalization reform.
The first classification is based on time period of risks; their
conclusion is similar to that of Agoraki et al. (2011).
Another way of classification is based on risks scope of
influence and divides risks into microrisks and macrorisks.
Besides, these authors also put forward three ways of risk
measurements, namely interest rate sensitivity analysis,
duration analysis, and beta coefficient analysis.
Delis and Kouretas (2011), considering 16 euro area
countries over the period 2001–2008, divide up risk into
four basic characteristics, i.e., marketability, fundamental-
ity, relativity, and system stability. In this line of thought,
one can compare to current interest rates in China and
come to the conclusion that both inter-bank bonds repur-
chase market rate and China inter-bank offered rate
(CHIBOR) are in high degree of marketization; therefore,
the basic interest rate of China could be settled down. On
the other hand, comparing these two interest rates, inter-
bank bonds repurchase market rate is found to perform
better than China inter-bank offered rate, for the four basic
characteristics. At last, after a Granger causality test, they
conclude that inter-bank bonds repurchase market rate is
the best basic interest rate to be set.
Among related works, Agoraki et al. (2011) carried out
empirical analysis for 13 Central and Eastern European
banking systems over the period 1998–2005, dividing
interest rate liberalization risk into phased risk and per-
manent risk. The phased risk means that the fluctuations in
net incomes or net assets happened in the initial stage of
interest rate liberalization, while the permanent risk refers
to the common interest rate risk. They think that managing
interest rate risk, for one thing, needs risk identification
from the inside of banks and on-and-off management needs
transparent decision making from financial regulation
departments and effective market incentives.
More recently, Mihai-Yiannaki and Rios-Morales
(2015) thoroughly discussed changes in ‘‘operating strate-
gies of the whole (Chinese) banking system, for both
nationalized and the private commercial banks,’’ following
‘‘the duplication and consecutive cut of the deposit and
loan interest rates, together with the simultaneous loosen-
ing of the interest rate floating range of their financial
institutions.’’ An efficient GARCH (1,1) model, as well
justified in Jafari et al. (2007) together with the VaR (Jo-
rion 1997), was used to identify the way the interests are
adjusted, in particular the influence of interest rate on risks.
Our study is also closely related to the studies of Korean
Banks by Aggarwal et al. (2005), Cui (2016), and of
M. Ausloos et al.
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Chinese banks by Chi and Fu (2016); both studies proposed
the investigation of commercial banks interest rate risk
management under the interest rate liberalization. The first
study uses the data of monthly interest rate from the
International Monetary Fund, where the long-term interest
rate is the average yield on National Housing Bonds and
the short-term interest rate is the average daily rate on call
money. Aggarwal et al. (2005) showed that Korean banks
sensitivity was positive for expected, but negative for
unexpected interest rate changes during the period of
government control. Later, Beutler et al. (2017) concluded
that loan growth for private banks was more likely to
become sensitive to interest rate changes. In fact, much
before, Ahmed et al. (1997) had indicated that interest rate
risk management was mainly intensive on the interest rate
sensitivity of net income. Gomez et al. (2016) showed that
‘‘the cash-flow exposure of banks to interest rate risk, or
income gap, affects the transmission of monetary policy
shocks to bank lending.’’ The study by Cui (2016) uses the
interest rate data and the data of interest-sensitive assets
and liabilities of nine banks using the interest-sensitive
model; he discovered that the irrational allocation of
medium- and long-term assets and liabilities in banking
structure also hold a true significant relationship. However,
Drehmann et al. (2010) indicated that only using gap
analysis would lead to miscalculate the risks for banks. In
fact, even though the method takes into account the pricing
error, the result will not capture the negative impact on the
interest rate on assets quality.
3 Research methodology (hypotheses)
In the following, we combine qualitative methods and
quantitative methods to substantiate theoretical considera-
tions with facts. We apply qualitative methods in order to
analyze the process of Chinese interest rate liberalization as
well as the classification of interest rate risks faced by
Chinese commercial banks during the process of interest
rate liberalization. In line with the above-recalled investi-
gations, we introduce three types of measurements for the
management of commercial bank interest rate risk analysis,
namely the interest rate sensitivity gap analysis, the dura-
tion analysis, and the VaR analysis. This leads to so-called
3 ? 1 hypotheses.
We pose to argue on the choice of such methods: since
the different measurements of interest rate risks lead to
various ways or strategies for managing interest rate risks,
it seems of interest to observe how much different the
results can be. Moreover, it is our aim to select an opti-
mized and suitable way for commercial banks to measure
interest rate risks, according to each way characteristics
and specifically for commercial banks’ practical situation.
It is admitted that the level of risk management in Chinese
commercial banks nowadays is a bit in a premature stage,
while the management mechanisms are not yet considered
to be perfect (Haselmann and Wachtel 2007). Therefore,
the interest rate sensitivity gap analysis seems a suit-
able way of investigation. This mechanism appears to be
the most popular way used by commercial banks (Laeven
and Levine 2009; Eid 2012).
H10 The proposed mechanism to measure the interest rate
risk will give information on the financial liberalization
policies to be activated for economic efficiency and
growth.
Additionally, the duration analysis provides an inter-
esting analyzing process, with all-rounded and scientific
results; thus, we add the duration analysis as a supple-
mentary tool for the purpose of assisting commercial banks
to measure and manage their interest rate risks.
H20 The duration analysis determines both, either nega-
tive or positive, effects of the interest rate on assets quality,
income, and profitability of banks.
‘‘Finally,’’ under the current development of Chinese
commercial banks, widely applying VaR analysis leads to
certain conceptual difficulties, as mentioned here above.
However, it is expected that with a deepened development
of research, the continuous perfection of interest rate
management system, and financial literacy skills
improvement of managers, the VaR analysis might be
generally introduced to optimize interest rate risk man-
agement in Chinese commercial banks (Haselmann and
Wachtel 2007).
H30 The VaR analysis might be generally introduced to
optimize interest rate risk management in Chinese com-
mercial banks.
Whence,
H40 The Chinese commercial banks improve their risk
management using interest rate sensitivity and duration gap
analysis as appropriate risk management tools under the
present interest rate liberalization.
Ten commercial banks (full list in Sect. 5) have been
selected in order to evaluate interest rate risks during
2008–2014. This time period contains the latest increase
and decrease in interest rates. These ten commercial banks
include three different kinds of commercial banks (see
Sect. 5), commonly accepted to be representative and
valuable. Data used in this paper are collected from the ten
banks’ balance sheets and their income statements from
2008 to 2014; they provide some information on assets,
liabilities, and profits. Table 7 in ‘‘Appendix 1’’ presents
the deposit and loan benchmark interest rate in these
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financial institutions from 2008 to 2014. These ten com-
mercial banks include three different kinds of commercial
banks (see Sect. 5), commonly accepted to be representa-
tive and valuable. Furthermore, this paper uses the deposit
benchmark interest rate of RMB in financial institutions
from Peoples Bank of China as the liability interest rate of
commercial banks, while the loan benchmark interest rate
of RMB in financial institutions from Peoples Bank of
China is used for the asset interest rate of commercial
banks.
Finally, to be more specific, this paper vertically con-
trasts the composition of operating income and interest rate
sensitivity gap within the ten banks in the same year while
horizontally contrasting the same contents within one bank
over a 7-year period. In so doing, it is expected to find out
whether the structure of assets and liabilities coincide with
the trend of interest rate changes, thereby justifying the
ability of interest rate risk management for the three kinds
of commercial banks. In addition, China Construction
Bank (CCB) will be taken as an example, applying the
duration model to analyze its duration gap and what the
change of net asset is when interest rate changes.
4 Measurement and management
of interest rate risks
Interest rate risk is regarded as one of the major financial
risks that commercial banks face; therefore, interest rate
risk management plays an important part in commercial
banks’ operation. Specifically, the measurement of interest
rate risk is the priority in interest rate risk (Ballester et al.
2011) since regular measurements could enable commer-
cial banks to estimate the influence caused by interest rate
changes in a timely way, so that to adjust the commercial
banks’ structure of assets and liabilities and increase their
net incomes and net assets.
4.1 Interest rate sensitivity analysis
The interest rate sensitivity gap concerns the balance
between interest rate sensitivity asset and interest rate
sensitivity liabilities. Specifically, interest rate sensitivity
assets refer to the assets that will expire after a certain time
and to the assets for which one needs to reset their interest
rates, according to market interest rates: for example, cash
or deposits in the Central Bank. Interest rate sensitivity
liabilities have the same characteristics as interest rate
sensitivity assets, such as loans from the Central Bank.
The measurement of interest rate sensitivity gap depends
on its observation period. For instance, a trading financial
liability term to repricing is equal to 1 year; if its obser-
vation period is set to be 3 months, then the liability is not
an interest rate sensitivity liability and cannot be calculated
for the gap. However, if the observation period is set to be
1 year, then the liability can be seen as an interest rate
sensitivity liability and the liability should be fully
counted.
4.2 Interest rate sensitivity gap analysis
equations
In the interest rate sensitivity gap analysis, two equations
are used: one for the interest rate sensitivity gap (IRSG)
and the other for the interest rate sensitivity rate (IRSR)
IRSG ¼ IRSA  IRSL; ð1Þ
IRSG ¼ IRSA/IRSL; ð2Þ
both in terms of the interest rate sensitivity assets (IRSA)
and interest rate sensitivity liabilities (IRSL). The first
equation leads to measuring an absolute amount, while the
second equation measures a relative quantity.
From these equations, it can be seen that when an
interest rate sensitivity asset is larger than an interest rate
sensitivity liability, the interest sensitivity gap is larger
than 0, and vice versa. When an interest rate sensitivity
asset equals an interest rate sensitivity liability, the interest
sensitivity gap equals zero. Meanwhile, as can be seen
from the second equation, when an interest rate sensitivity
asset is larger than its interest rate sensitivity liability, the
interest rate sensitivity rate is larger than 1, and vice versa.
In short, here, the interest rate risk of commercial banks
would increase along with the enlargement of the interest
rate sensitivity rate.
4.3 Principle of interest rate sensitivity gap
management
Both interest rate sensitivity gap and interest rate sensi-
tivity rate can be used to measure interest rate risks; fur-
thermore, they are complementary. That is to say, when the
interest rate sensitivity gap is positive, the interest rate
sensitivity rate is definitely larger than 1, and vice versa.
On the other hand, the interest rate sensitivity gap shows
how much the deficits can be. Thus, when commercial
banks manage their interest rate risks, both measures are
useful.
As for Eq. (1), one can write the net interest income
changes (NIIC) as the ‘‘weighted difference equation’’:
NIIC ¼ ðIRSA  AIRCÞ  ðIRSL  LIRCÞ; ð3Þ
in terms of the interest rate sensitivity asset times the asset
interest rate changes (AIRC), on the one hand, and of the
interest rate sensitivity liability times the liability interest
rate changes (LIRC), on the other hand.
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Thus, if banks face similar (assets and liabilities) interest
rate changes, the one encountering the largest risk is when
its absolute value of interest rate sensitivity gap is the
greatest, i.e., when the interest rate sensitivity rate much
deviates from 1. Consequently, commercial banks need to
forecast the future trend of interest rates accurately so that
to manage its structure of assets and liabilities in advance
and finally take advantage of interest rate changes in order
to earn profits from net interest rate income, instead of
making losses. This is summarized in Table 1. According
to Table 1, when the prediction of interest rate has an
increasing trend, banks should adjust their structure of
assets and liabilities in view of keeping the interest rate
sensitivity gap positive. This can increase the interest rate
income to the point of becoming larger than the amplitude
of the interest rate expenditure, because the interest rate
growth would bring an increase in the net interest rate
income. When the trend of interest rate is expected to
decrease, banks should keep the interest rate sensitivity gap
in the negative realm. Then, the reduced range of interest
rate income would be less than that of interest rate
expenditure, whence banks would increase their net interest
rate income as well.
4.4 Duration analysis: duration and modified
(differential) duration
Duration measure analysis was intuitively proposed by
Macaulay (1938). It was first used to calculate the expired
date of fixed income bonds and to measure the sensitivity
of bond prices toward interest rate changes. After the
1970s, many western banks used the duration analysis as
their main tool for measuring the actual payback period of
all fixed income financial instruments and the sensitivities
of fixed income instruments prices toward interest rate
changes. Since then, the duration analysis has been one of
the most important methods for managing interest rate risks
in commercial banks.
The duration analysis equation reads
Dt ¼ 1
PV
XT
i¼1
Ct
1þ ið Þt t ð4Þ
in which Dt is the ‘‘duration’’ and Ct refers to the cash flow
of fixed income instruments at time t; T refers to the expiry
date of the financial instrument; i means the discounted rate
which is usually the market interest rate at time t; and PV
means the ‘‘present (or timely) value’’ of the financial
instrument
PV ¼
XT
i¼1
Ct
1þ ið Þt : ð5Þ
From the above duration equation, Eq. (4), it can be seen
that when a single fixed income instrument has much cash
flow in the early stage of a validity period, its duration will
be accordingly shorter. Usually, a modified (differential)
duration measure D* is defined (from now on, for con-
ciseness we drop the ‘‘index’’ t, if there is no confusion) in
terms of PV and i,
D ¼  1
PV
DPV
Di
ð6Þ
D ¼
Xn
i¼1
PVi
PV
Di ð7Þ
where D means the first-order variation. As mentioned
before, the duration not only can be used to measure a
single financial instrument interest rate risk, but can be also
applied to financial instruments portfolio. Then, the
‘‘portfolio duration’’ is the weighted average of the specific
duration of a financial instrument, where the weight is the
ratio between each financial instrument market price and
the portfolio market price in which Di refers to the i dura-
tion, while PVi refers to the i market price and n is the
number of financial instruments in the portfolio.
4.5 Duration gap equations
When the market interest rate changes, commercial banks
not only need to consider the changes happening in interest
rate incomes and outcomes, i.e., the interest rate sensitivity
for assets and liabilities, but also should be concerned with
noninterest rate sensitivity on assets and liabilities; indeed,
these could run into annoying risks as well. In order to take
the interest rate risks of all assets and liabilities, when the
interest rate is predicted to be changing, commercial banks
need to apply some ‘‘duration gap management’’ method,
by adjusting the structure of assets and liabilities, so that
one controls the duration gap for increasing market value.
One can write the modified duration gap (Dgap) equation
in terms of the modified durations, respectively, DL and
DA, for the total assets and for the total liabilities, as
Table 1 Sketch of the relationship between interest rate changes
(IRC), sensitivity gap (SG), sensitivity rate (SR), and net interest
income changes (NIIC)
IRC SG SR NIIC
Increase Positive [ 1 Increase
Negative \ 1 Increase
Zero = 0 Invariant
Decrease Positive [ 1 Decrease
Negative \ 1 Increase
Zero = 0 Invariant
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Dgap ¼ DADiA  DLDiL
L
A
 DA DiA
1þ iA  DL
DiL
1þ iL
L
A
ð8Þ
in which iA and DiA are the asset interest rate and its
variation, respectively, while iL and DiL have an immediate
understanding: the liability interest rate and its variation,
respectively.
4.6 Principle of duration gap management
The duration gap management is one of the most important
ways for commercial banks assets/liabilities management:
it presents the all-rounded interest rate risks for commercial
banks (Bierwag et al. 1992). When the duration gap is
positive, according to its equation, the product of total asset
duration and total asset is larger than that of total liability
duration and total liability. Then, if the interest rate
decreases, the market value of both total asset and total
liability will increase. Moreover, the total assets market
value will grow more than the total liability market value.
As a result, the net asset will go up accordingly.
If the interest rate increases, on the contrary, the
dynamics goes the other way around. On the other hand, if
the duration gap is negative, the result will be the opposite.
Only when the duration gap is equal to zero, no matter how
the interest rate is changing, the market value of total assets
and liabilities will change at the same time at the same
pace; therefore, the net assets of commercial banks would
not change. That is to say, in such a case, there is no
interest rate risk for commercial banks.
Combining the modified duration equation and the
modified duration gap equation, one obtains a relationship
between the changes in commercial banks’ net assets DV
and the modified duration as well as total assets:
DV  DA DL ¼ ADADiA þ LDLDiL  ADgap ð9Þ
According to Eq. (9), when the interest rate changes, two
factors influence the commercial banks’ net asset. One is
the bank’s modified duration gap: the larger the modified
duration gap absolute value is, the more changes the
commercial bank net assets will have under the given
interest rate and asset scale. The other is the value of the
commercial bank total asset: the larger the market value is,
the more changes in net assets there will be under the given
interest rate and certain modified duration gap. Bierwag
et al. (1992) suggested that since commercial bank asset
scales do not dramatically change, the interest rate risk
management of commercial banks should focus on
dynamically regulating the structure of assets and liabilities
and keeping changes in modified duration gap suitable with
interest rates.
4.7 Value-at-Risk Analysis
The value-at-risk (Jorion 1997) indicates the greatest pre-
dicted losses that investors could afford under a given
confidence level (e.g., 95% in this research). Thereafter, a
VaR analysis is performed to evaluate the greatest losses of
given assets or liabilities during a certain time interval and
for a certain confidence level a, i.e.
a ¼
Z 1
R
f Rð ÞdR ð10Þ
VaR  EðRÞ  R; ð11Þ
ProbðDRVaRÞ ¼ 1a: ð12Þ
In such equations, the confidence level is usually taken to
be at 99%, 95% or 90%; f (R) is the probability density
function of a single financial asset (or an investment
portfolio) market value R; R* is the lowest market value of
the single financial asset (or investment portfolio) under a
confidence; prob is the probability; VaR means the ‘‘value-
at-risk’’ for the a confidence level; and DR is the actual loss
for a single financial asset (or an investment portfolio)
during the holding time interval. This equation shows that
the possibility of actual losses to be larger than the value-
at-risk is quite low; thus, applying a VaR analysis allows to
predict the losses if interest rates changes are forthcoming.
5 Study case: ten Chinese commercial banks
Recall that we consider ten commercial banks; they are
distinguished as being four state-owned commercial banks,
three joint-stock commercial banks, and three local com-
mercial banks. The four state-owned commercial banks are
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), China
Construction Bank (CCB), Bank of China Limited (BOC),
and Agricultural Bank of China (ABC). The three joint-
stock commercial banks are China Merchants Bank
(CMB), Shanghai Pudong Development Bank (SHPDB),
and China Citic Bank (Citic). The three local commercial
banks are Bank of Beijing Co., Ltd. (BOB), Bank of
Nanjing (BONA), and Bank of Ningbo (BONI).
A short explanatory note: the reason for choosing these
three joint-stock commercial banks is based on Standard
and Poor’s Ratings Services; these three banks are ranked
as the top three in total assets. Based on these ten banks’
balance sheets and income statements during 2008–2014,
we apply the above operating income analysis method, the
interest rate sensitivity gap analysis, and the duration
analysis for our empirical research about ‘‘interest rate
risks management,’’ at the present ‘‘interest rate liberal-
ization’’ time, in such an ‘‘Emerging Country.’’
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It is fair to recall again here that Mihai-Yiannaki and
Rios-Morales (2015) looked at earnings data on BOC,
CCB, and CMB, on a shorter timescale (between
September 2010 and November 2012) than in our case, and
from a different risk perspective.
5.1 Operating income analysis
5.1.1 Net interest income in operating income percentage
analysis
According to the income statements of the banks, the
percentage of net interest income (NII) in operating income
from 2008 to 2014 is reported in Table 2 and Fig. 1
Vertically comparing the data means to compare a given
bank net interest income during a time interval, and next to
compare the average data of all banks. According to
Table 2 and Fig. 1, during the examined 7 years, the
average percentage floats near [80%, 85%]. This is regar-
ded as a high level. Because of such a high percentage
value, when the interest rate changes, the net interest rate
income will change accordingly; this might make com-
mercial banks face a great interest rate risk. The reason for
this, as can be argued in line with Agoraki et al. (2011), is
the major business of Chinese commercial banks is in
deposits and loans, the off-balance-sheet activities merely
playing a secondary role. In other words, the main oper-
ating incomes are interest incomes. In a horizontal analysis,
from Table 2 and Fig. 1, e.g., in 2014, comparing different
banks’ net interest income within one specific year, it is
found that the four state-owned banks own more capitals
and have more powerfully prone operations than the seven
others. Besides, their business scale might be larger than
the joint-stock banks and the local commercial banks. It is
noticeable that Bank of China (BOC) might dominate in
international settlements.
5.1.2 Handling charges and commissions income
in operating income percentage analysis
The percentage of handling charge and commissions
income in operating income from 2008 to 2012 (%) is
reported for each bank in Table 3.
As aforementioned, from a ‘‘vertical comparison,’’
looking at Table 3 and Fig. 2, it can be seen that the per-
centage of handling charge and commissions income in
operating income tends to be on an increasing trend. In our
case, the first five banks kept their percentage at around
13% in 2008, while in 2014 the percentage went up to 20%.
The last five banks kept their percentages lower than 10%
in 2008, but do generally grow during the 7-year period.
Compared to Dell’Ariccia et al.’s (2014) results, these
numbers are found to be far away below those found for
banks of developed countries. (In their paper, Dell’Ariccia
et al. examined United Bank of Switzerland, Royal Bank of
Scotland, Bank of America, and Hong Kong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation (HSBC).) Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014)
show that noninterest incomes take more than 40% in all
operating incomes in developed countries, while nonin-
terest incomes are over 50% in all these listed international
banks. The authors also point out that these banks’ major
business is in insurance services, investment deal, and
investment banks, which clearly provide them with large
operating incomes. A ‘‘conclusion’’ will follow below.
Next, when horizontally analyzing the data, it can be
observed that state-owned commercial banks have the
highest handling charge and commissions, while local
commercial banks have the lowest fees. Compared with
joint-stock commercial banks and local commercial banks,
state-owned commercial banks’ off-balance-sheet activities
are more boarded in fact. This is mainly because state-
owned commercial banks own a much larger capital, which
are more likely capable of taking risks, as well as
expending new business in other areas. Thus, by vertically
and horizontally analyzing the percentage of net interest
income, handling charge, and commissions income in
operating income, and remembering Dell’Ariccia et al.
(2014) remarks, it can be concluded that the operating scale
of (such) Chinese commercial banks should be usefully
expanded; off-balance-sheet activities income should be
taken more into accounts, so that the interest rate risks are
in fine reduced.
5.1.3 Horizontal analysis of interest rate sensitivity gap
In Table 8 of ‘‘Appendix 2,’’ we report the data quoted
directly from the ten banks’ annual reports at the end of
2014. Starting from such data, next, one takes the bench-
mark interest rate of deposit and loan in 2014 in order to
evaluate each bank’s interest rate risks. Among all the
Table 2 Percentage of net interest income (NII) in operating income
for the ten considered commercial banks from 2008 to 2014
NII % 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
ICBC 84.92 79.44 79.76 76.34 77.82 81.37 78.51
CCB 84.08 79.30 77.75 76.70 76.66 80.38 77.91
BOC 71.37 68.42 70.07 69.50 70.19 69.95 69.88
ABC 91.79 81.72 83.38 81.33 81.02 85.63 82.66
CMB 84.77 78.46 79.96 76.36 77.95 81.06 78.46
SHPDB 91.24 91.08 90.67 90.46 88.44 91.00 89.97
Citic 89.88 88.19 86.32 84.61 84.40 88.13 85.71
BOB 90.12 92.10 92.60 90.56 88.52 91.61 90.23
BONA 80.53 87.30 87.11 87.26 84.43 84.98 85.56
BONI 84.93 85.11 86.51 85.78 89.11 85.52 86.80
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variables, the accumulated interest rate sensitivity gap is
the sum of all interest rate sensitivity gaps during the given
time period. According to Table 8 in ‘‘Appendix 2,’’ gen-
erally speaking, most commercial banks present a negative
interest rate sensitivity gap over a short term, but they
present a positive value over the long term. During a
3-month observation period, Citic and BOB show a posi-
tive interest rate sensitivity gap. Over a 1-year observation
period, each BOC, CMB and SHPDB accumulated interest
rate sensitivity gap tends to be positive. During a 5-year
observation period, only the BONI accumulated interest
rate sensitivity gap is positive. Meanwhile, when the
observation period is over 5 years, each ICBC, CCB, ABC
and BONA accumulated interest rate sensitivity gap has a
positive value.
According to the data from the People’s Bank of China,
the benchmark interest rates of deposits and loans tend to
decrease. It means that Citic and BOB, for which the
sensitivity gap is positive, will go through a loss in net
interest incomes; the other eight banks will increase since
they present a negative sensitivity gap on a short-term
basis. On the other hand, the accumulated interest rate
sensitivity gap showing a positive value will cause a
reduction in the net interest income (NII) for the long-term
asset and liability allocation.
Soto (2004) once analyzed the reasons why commercial
banks obtain a negative value for the short term but a
positive value for the long term. He suggests that this is
because, first of all, most assets of banks are long-term
deposits, e.g., enterprise credits and personal housing
mortgage loans, while the liabilities mainly are short-term
loans, such as current deposits and fixed term deposits.
Secondly, since the benchmark interest rate of deposits and
loans in financial institutions tends to go up during the
recent years, commercial banks forecast that the bench-
mark interest rate will keep growing, inducing them to
adjust their structure of assets and liabilities in order that
the interest rate sensitivity gap is positive. However, in
order to keep testable the development of the economy, the
benchmark interest rate should decrease a little bit.
When looking at Table 8, horizontally, the rank of
accumulated interest rate sensitivity gaps absolute value
Fig. 1 Histogram of the percentage of net interest income (NII) in
operating income from 2008 to 2014 for ten Chinese commercial
banks. Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), China
Construction Bank (CCB), Bank of China Ltd (BOC), and Agricul-
tural Bank of China (ABC) are four state-owned commercial banks.
China Merchants Bank (CMB), Shanghai Pudong Development Bank
(SHPDB), and China Citic Bank (Citic) are three joint-stock
commercial banks. Three local commercial banks are Bank of
Beijing Co. (BOB), Bank of Nanjing (BONA), and Bank of Ningbo
(BONI)
Table 3 Percentage of handling charge and commissions income
(HCCI) in operating income for the ten Chinese commercial banks
from 2008 to 2014
HCCI % 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
ICBC 14.21 17.82 19.13 21.37 19.75 17.05 19.39
CCB 14.37 17.99 20.44 21.91 20.29 17.60 19.93
BOC 17.50 19.82 19.68 19.70 19.10 19.00 19.27
ABC 11.27 16.03 15.88 18.20 17.74 14.39 16.78
CMB 14.00 15.54 15.87 16.25 17.41 15.14 16.27
SHPDB 5.19 5.99 8.12 9.89 10.54 6.43 8.95
Citic 7.58 10.34 10.21 11.48 12.53 9.38 11.13
BOB 3.97 5.47 6.17 7.78 9.61 5.20 7.53
BONA 6.84 9.05 8.95 9.79 10.15 8.28 9.41
BONI 11.03 10.81 8.26 9.03 9.49 10.03 9.52
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over 5 years is local commercial banks, state-owned
commercial banks and joint-stock commercial banks,
respectively, whereby three local commercial banks’
amounts are over 100 trillion, four state-owned commercial
banks’ numbers are between 5 trillion and 10 trillion, two
joint-stock commercial banks’ amounts are less than 2
trillion while SHPDBs number is over 1000 trillion.
Because of the downturn trend of interest rate in deposits
and loans in 2014, if commercial banks are unable to adjust
their interest rate sensitivity gap into positive value, at
least, they should keep a low level of positive interest rate
sensitivity gap (Eid 2012).
5.1.4 Vertical analysis of interest rate sensitivity gap
As mentioned before, we select the China Construction
Bank (CCB) as a representative case, in order to calculate
its interest rate sensitivity gap and to vertically analyze the
data: at the end of each year, CCB presents a negative
sensitivity gap for the short term, while showing a positive
value for the long term. The pertinent data can be seen in
Table 9 of ‘‘Appendix 3.’’
5.1.5 Interest rate risk measure
Let us assume for an interest rate risk measurement that the
time period is 1 year: let interest rate sensitivity assets and
liabilities only include assets or liabilities that expired
within 1 year, or that one redecides the interest rate within
1 year. The numerical result obtained from Eq. (3) is
reported in Table 4.
When combining Tables 4 and 10 from ‘‘Appendix 4,’’
it can be seen that in 2008, the benchmark interest rate of
deposits and loans increased considerably, the CCB interest
rate sensitivity gap remaining negative. Therefore, CCB
went through great losses in its net interest income. During
the recent years, since the benchmark interest rate of
deposits and loans slightly fluctuated but remained in a
downturn trend, CCB adjustment in interest rate sensitivity
gap seemed not that much constrained.
5.2 CCB duration analysis
For the convenience of calculation, two ‘‘projection
planes’’ are chosen before doing the pertinent duration
analysis for CCB.
5.2.1 Projection plane 1
The assets and liabilities are divided into without interest,
less than 3 months, 3 months to 1 year, 1–5 years, and
more than 5 years; the duration of without interest assets
and liabilities are both equal to zero, while for the latter
four categories, the expired date or repricing date is set to
be the median of the interval, i.e., 1.5 months, 9 months,
3 years and 8 years, respectively.
Fig. 2 Histogram of the
percentage of Handling Charge
and Commissions Income in
Operating Income from 2008 to
2014 for ten Chinese
commercial banks
Table 4 Next-year net interest income change (NIIC) for CCB
At the end of Next-year net interest income change
2008 - 2,180,958.30
2009 4866.21
2010 0.00
2011 - 430,596.67
2012 - 1,191,047.25
2013 100,011.64
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5.2.2 Projection plane 2
The discounted rate for assets and its interests is taken from
the benchmark interest rate for loans in financial institu-
tions, as published on the official Web site of the Peoples
Bank of China; he discounted rate for liability, and its
interest is taken from the benchmark interest rate of
deposit. One usually calculates the interest on the current
deposit of Chinese commercial banks quarterly. We use
such a quarterly value here when calculating the duration
D. As a result, the asset discounted rate used for the
duration is 6.1%, while the liability discounted rate is
3.1%.
Moreover, the unit for duration is taken as 1 year.
‘‘Appendix 5’’ is the adapted balance sheet according to
the above projection planes. Thus, according to Eqs. (4)–
(5) and Table 11, it is easy to calculate the duration of CCB
interest-bearing assets and liabilities and their corre-
sponding present value for different times. The results are
shown in Table 5. Taking 1.5-month cash and deposits in
the Central Bank as an example, next combining Eqs. (5)
and (7), the duration and its present value could be
explicitly calculated.
5.3 Duration gap analysis
Based on the data from ‘‘Appendix 5’’ and Table 5, we can
obtain numbers for the present value of assets, assets
duration, liabilities, the present value of liabilities and
liabilities duration of each case and work out the percent-
age of the present value for each asset and liability. The
results are shown in Table 6: the duration of total assets is
0.9781; the duration of total liabilities is 0.4834. It can be
seen that the CCB duration of total assets at the end of
2013 is greater than its duration of total liabilities: this
means that the average repayment term of assets is longer,
almost the double of average repayment term of liabilities.
At the end of 2012, the benchmark lending rate of
financial institution is 6.15%, down 0.15% on 2014, and
the benchmark deposit interest rate of financial institution
is 2.60%, down 0.25% on 2014; the results are in Table 6.
According to the data in the table, using Eq. (8, eq. 3.11),
the calculations of the modified duration gap for
1.5 months, 9 months, 3 years, 8 years and overall of CCB
at the end of 2013 are 0.0002, - 0.0012, - 0.0035,
- 0.0280, - 0.0024, as displayed in Table 6. Except for
1.5 month, the modified duration gap is a positive number;
all others terms are negative numbers.
5.4 Theoretical consequence of such interest
rate sensitivity gap analysis and duration
analysis
The analysis of the interest rate sensitivity gap allows to
conclude that the increasing profit of net interest of CCB in
2014 will be ^ 100,011 millions RMB, while the net asset
of CCB in 2014 will grow to ^ 28,692 millions RMB,
according to the result of duration analysis. These two
Table 5 Duration (D) of CCB,
rounded to three decimals for
(top) interest-bearing assets and
(bottom) liabilities with
interests and their present value
(PV) at the end of 2013
1.5 months 9 months 3 years 8 years
D PV D PV D PV D PV
Interest-bearing assets
CDCB 0.125 2,178,298 – – – – – –
DLOB 0.125 278,959 0.745 102,914 2.883 1046 7.080 60
BRpFA 0.125 199,198 0.743 1062.7467 – – – –
LAC 0.125 3,496,784 0.740 2,738,238 2.7785 26,663 6.458 64,571
Investm. 0.125 258,520 0.744 456,388 2.863 1,031,587 6.949 736,719
Total 0.125 6,411,759 0.740 3,298,603 2.861 1,041,296 6.910 801,350
Liabilities with interests
LCB 0.125 2214 – – – – – –
LLOB 0.125 947,600 0.746 58,196 2.904 37,143 – –
TFL 0.125 11,643 0.748 9182 – – – –
FASRp 0.125 9574 0.740 935 – – – –
CD 0.125 7,171,957 0.747 2,034,684 2.933 663,361 7.487 6830
IDS 0.125 18,107 0.744 20,565 2.865 31,398 7.048 100,729
Total 0.125 8,161,095 0.747 2,123,563 2.929 731,902 7.076 107,559
CDCB cash and deposit in Central Bank, DLOB deposits in and loans to other banks, BRpFA buy-in
repurchase financial assets, LAC loans and advances from customers, LCB loans from Central Bank, LLOB
liabilities in and loan from other banks, TFL trading financial liabilities, FASRp financial assets sold for
repurchase, CD customers deposits, IDS issued debt securities
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interest rate risk measures are rather consistent—for
interest rate cuts, CCB will profit on net interest and net
asset. Furthermore, the data also prove the rationality of
such analyses, i.e., to use interest rate sensitivity measures
as the major interest rate risk management tools and to use
the duration gap as an interesting management method, for
commercial banks.
The interest rate level in China is decided by the Central
Bank; the main cause for interest rate level changes is
China’s interest rate policy. However, with interest rate
marketization going deeper, the decision-making power on
Chinese interest rate levels by the Central Bank will be
more limited; it should gradually convert to indirect input
causes. It can be admitted that the market factors will
become the true cause of influence on the interest rate
levels. As a consequence, after the marketization of interest
rate, the changes in interest rate will become more fre-
quent. This should require commercial banks to make more
systematic or more regular quantitative analysis, as
developed above. The banks should dynamically adjust
their structure of assets and liabilities in order to defuse the
risks induced by interest rate changes, in view of main-
taining their net interest and net profit of net assets at their
intended level.
6 Conclusion and recommendations/
discussion
To conclude, the research has analyzed the risk level and
control ability of commercial banks in China under the
influence of interest rate liberalization. When measuring
interest rate risks, i.e., calculating the sensitivity gap, joint-
stock commercial banks are found to perform better than
both state-owned commercial banks and local commercial
banks. This is probably because the joint-stock commercial
banks are ‘‘newly born’’ in China; being ‘‘more modern’’
and ‘‘already more flexible,’’ they are more capable of
managing interest rate risks and grasping the trends of
interest rates. A contrario, state-owned commercial banks’
assets/liabilities scale ranges are too large to adjust in a
short-time term. Similarly, local commercial banks are less
capable of managing interest rate risks, since they might be
short of related all-rounded and matured regulations.
Therefore, it has been shown that (H10) the duration
analysis provides an interesting analyzing process, with all-
rounded and scientific results, as a tool for the purpose of
assisting commercial banks to measure and manage their
interest rate risks. Moreover, (H20) the duration analysis
determines negative and positive effects of the interest rate
on assets quality, income, and profitability of banks. Fur-
thermore, (H30), the VaR analysis is shown to be a valu-
able technique which could be introduced to optimize
interest rate risk management, in Chinese commercial
banks. We could also add that the conditional value-at-risk
(CVaR) used for the evaluation of portfolios (Cerqueti
et al. 2018) could be also implemented at the bank level.
We have shown through a ‘‘vertical study’’ of CCB that
the duration analysis can be explicitly performed along our
proposed methodology and so allows one to obtain the
present values of each asset and liability. It can be noticed
from Table 6 that the CCB duration of total assets at the
end of 2013 is greater than its duration of liabilities: this
implies that the average repayment term of assets is greater
(almost twice) than the average of repayment term of lia-
bilities. Also, Table 6 indicates that only for 1.5 month the
modified duration gap is positive; all the terms are nega-
tive. As a result of a slight decline in the benchmark
interest rate of deposits and loans on 2014, CCB net asset
for the 1.5-month term will decrease, while the net asset for
the 9-month, 3-year, 8-year term and overall will increase.
From Eq. (10), one could specifically work out the profit of
the value of net asset for CCB in 2014; it is about
28,691.67 million RMB.
As conclusions, in view of the above findings and H40,
let us also present recommendations for reinforcing the
interest rate risk management of China and other countries,
commercial banks. Let us select four themes.
Table 6 Duration D of total
assets and liabilities
No interest 1.5 months 9 months 3 years 8 years Total
Assets 469,274 6,404,546 3,318,981 1,126,319 962,714 12,281,834
PV of Assets 469,274 6,411,759 3,298,603 1,041,296 801,350 12,022,281
Assets PV pcent. 3.90 53.33 27.42 8.66 6.66 100
D – 0.125 0.7403 2.8608 6.9097 0.9781
Liabilities 275,238 8,175,245 2,146,583 761,903 106,204 11,465,173
PV of liabilities 275,238 8,161,095 2,123,563 731,902 107,559 11,399,356
Liabilities PV pcent. 2.41 71.59 18.60 6.41 0.94 100
D – 0.125 0.7469 2.9285 7.0761 0.4834
D* – 0.0002 - 0.0012 - 0.0035 - 0.0280 - 0.0024
Modified duration gap D* of CCB at the end of 2013; PV present value, D* modified duration gap
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6.1 Set up a steady development strategy
It is assumed that after interest rate liberalization, com-
mercial banks might enhance their competitiveness by
lowering interest rates for loans and increasing deposit
interest rates. By doing so, the interest margin would be
narrowed down gradually. However, at the same time, in
order to afford, respectively, high capital costs, commercial
banks have to maintain their profits at a correspondingly
high level. At this point, it is highly possible for com-
mercial banks to invest in products that present high
income but also high risk. This is obviously far optimal for
the development of commercial banks. As a result, it is
highly necessary for commercial banks to control their
interest margin at a reasonable level so that to improve
their abilities of controlling deposits and loans and to
accomplish the effective control of profits and costs. This
opinion, geared to Chinese commercial banks, is still in
line with a nonrecent Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Detragiache’s
(1999) paper.
Besides, for Chinese commercial banks especially, it is
necessary to set up strategies that are market-oriented and
customer-oriented, which is often approved or even rec-
ommended by any Chinese government. For one thing,
Chinese commercial banks should adjust their products to
the current markets. (For the other, they should meet cus-
tomers’ needs to the largest possible extent.) As one would
deduce with Haselmann and Wachtel (2007), Chinese
commercial banks would become henceforth more com-
petitive and develop better under an appropriate risk
management.
6.2 Bank operation reform according
to the market
When interest rate liberalization happens, the first thing
that Chinese commercial banks should do is to make
reform inside the bank. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014) suggested
that Chinese commercial banks should modify their oper-
ational mechanism. Their suggestion infers that setting up
modern banks system while reforming modern corporation
system is beneficial to reach interest rate liberalization
since banks and corporations would obtain mutual benefits
and take risks separately.
In order to reach this goal, commercial banks should
expand financial innovation products,—since financial
(Ahmed et al. 1997) are capable to lead to great profits for
banks,—and for their customers. Besides, increasing the
proportion of intermediate business seems to be an efficient
process; the current proportion of intermediate business of
Chinese commercial banks is less than 20% (Soto 2004),
which is largely lower than that of developed countries—
more than 50% according to Soto (2004). As a result, it can
be expected and even believed that there is large potential
inside Chinese commercial banks’ intermediate business
actions.
6.3 Perfect the inner control in commercial
banks
It is admitted that inner control regulations are among the
most important factors toward commercial banks’ healthy
operations (Ballester et al. 2011). For instance, when a new
regulation or document of interest rate liberalization
arrives, the manager of a commercial bank should deliver it
to all employees and designate specific (and hopefully
competent) people to manage it.
Additionally, by the modern means of high technology,
commercial banks should be able to calculate the reason-
able scales of interest rates and their consequences, much
in advance of governmental information, to justify whether
there will be compliance or not. Adapting the inner control
system of commercial banks, it will be easier to achieve
interest rate liberalization and to reduce risks, thereby, very
importantly, maintaining and next optimizing their
stable operation.
Nevertheless, strictly obeying laws and regulations is
another significant factor that should never be ignored.
6.4 Prevent interest rate risks
Let us propose this final reasoning through a question
(Shehzad and De Haan 2009): after interest rate liberal-
ization, how much of the financial products will be really
determined by commercial banks? One should not com-
plain if the interest rate fluctuates at a quicker pace—and
be less predictable. In other words, the management of
interest rate risk will be more complicated. Therefore, it is
highly necessary for commercial banks to actively manage
interest rate risks. Commercial banks should set up an
interest rate risk management department in view of
applying measurement methods suitable for their own sit-
uation! Indeed, the phenomenon of increased risk conta-
gion can take place in the banking network like in stock
exchanges acting as ‘‘integrate-and-fire oscillators’’ (Bel-
lenzier et al. 2016).
Should one here say that Chinese and other commercial
banks need more highly qualified professionals able to do
deepened research in both macro- and microeconomy
problems such as providing economic situation, sound
theoretical and numerical analysis, and in fine policy ori-
entation and strategic planning? They should also be cap-
able of using advanced technology, be aware of modern
ideas to manage the structure of their commercial bank
assets and liabilities, as well as estimate interest rate risks.
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Applying suitable financial derivative instruments to pre-
vent interest rate risks will also avoid losses caused by
interest rate changes, but such a study is outside our present
report.
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Appendix 1
The deposit and loan benchmark interest rates in financial
institutions from 2008 to 2014 (%) are given in Table 7.
Table 7 Deposit and loan benchmark interest rate in financial institutions from 2008 to 2014 (%)
Adjusting Deposits Loans
Date 3 months 6 months 1 year 3 years 5 years B 6 months 6–12 months 1–3 years 3–4 years C 5
2008/9/16 3.33 3.78 4.14 5.40 5.85 6.21 7.20 7.29 7.56 7.7
2008/10/9 3.15 3.51 3.87 5.13 5.58 6.12 6.93 7.02 7.29 7.4
2008/10/30 2.88 3.24 3.60 4.77 5.13 6.03 6.66 6.75 7.02 7.5
2008/11/27 1.98 2.25 2.52 5.60 3.87 5.04 5.58 5.67 5.94 6.1
2008/12/23 1.71 1.98 2.25 3.33 3.60 4.86 5.31 5.40 5.76 5.9
2010/10/20 1.91 2.20 2.50 3.85 4.20 5.10 5.56 5.60 5.96 6.1
2010/12/26 2.25 2.50 2.75 4.15 4.55 5.35 5.81 5.85 6.22 6.4
2011/2/09 2.60 2.80 3.00 4.50 5.00 5.60 6.06 6.10 6.45 6.6
2011/4/06 2.85 3.05 3.25 4.75 5.25 5.85 6.31 6.40 6.65 6.8
2011/7/07 3.10 3.30 3.50 5.00 5.50 6.10 6.56 6.65 6.90 7.0
2012/6/08 2.85 3.05 3.25 4.65 5.10 5.85 6.31 6.40 6.65 6.8
2012/7/06 2.60 2.80 3.00 4.25 4.75 5.60 6.00 6.15 6.40 6.5
2014/11/22 2.35 2.55 2.75 3.35 4.00 5.60 5.60 6.00 6.00 6.1
Mo months, Yr Year
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Appendix 2
Numerical values of the ten commercial banks’ interest rate
sensitivity gap (IRSG) at the end of 2014 (million RMB)
are given in Table 8, together with their accumulated
interest rate sensitivity gap (AIRSG).
Appendix 3
Table 9 displays the interest rate sensitivity gap (IRSG)
analysis numerical results for CCB, from 2008 to 2014 (in
millions RMB), together with the corresponding accumu-
lated interest rate sensitivity gap (AIRSG).
Table 8 Ten Chinese
commercial banks’ interest rate
sensitivity gap (IRSG) and
accumulated interest rate
sensitivity gap (AIRSG) at the
end of 2014 (in million RMB)
Banks B 3 months 3 months to 1 year 1–5 years C 5 years
ICBC
IRSG - 1,887,041 976,190 584,145 1,189,959
AIRSG - 1,887,041 910,851 - 326,706 863,253
CCB
IRSG - 1,770,699 1,172,398 364,416 856,510
AIRSG - 1,770,699 - 598,301 - 233,885 622,625
BOC
IRSG - 1,686,160 1,703,906 73,372 458,081
AIRSG - 1,686,160 17,746 91,118 549,199
ABC
IRSG - 1,555,852 1,296,026 - 192,349 997,038
AIRSG - 1,555,852 - 259,826 - 452,175 544,863
CMB
IRSG - 124,219 134,135 63,349 73,566
AIRSG - 124,219 9916 73,265 146,831
SHPDB
IRSG - 122,786,504 202,643,393 15,356,334 59,537,051
AIRSG - 122,786,504 79,856,889 95,213,223 154,750,274
Citic
IRSG 124,546 79,372 - 32,150 2055
AIRSG 124,546 203,918 171,768 173,823
BOB
IRSG 12,562,561 22,289,775 - 1,047,251 55,873,794
AIRSG 12,562,561 9,727,214 - 10,774,765 45,099,059
BONA
IRSG - 90,112,263 73,178,086 4,382,123 21,887,554
AIRSG - 80,112,263 6,934,177 - 2,552,054 19,335,500
BONI
IRSG - 30,949,262 29,282,580 2,109,553 14,544,798
AIRSG - 30,949,262 - 1,666,682 442,871 14,987,669
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Appendix 4
The influence of interest rate changes (IRC) upon the net
interest income (NII) of CCB from 2009 to 2014 (million
RMB) is displayed in Table 10, distinguishing the total
assets (TA) and the total liabilities (TL).
Appendix 5
The actual interest rate and interest-bearing assets and
liabilities at the end of 2013 for CCB are given in Table 11.
For example, from Eq. (5), one obtains PV  2, 170,
237.
Table 9 Interest rate sensitivity gap analysis of CCB from 2008 to 2014 (million)
At the end of CCB Total Without interests B 3 months 3 months to 1 year 1–5 years C 5 years
2008 IRSG 330,204 19,794 - 1,536,503 1,149,734 269,811 427,368
AIRSG - 1,536,503 - 386,769 - 116,958 310,410
2009 IRSG 422,281 45,016 - 1,846,674 1,135,439 658,492 430,008
AIRSG - 1,846,674 - 711,235 - 52,743 377,265
2010 IRSG 467,562 35,774 - 1,635,631 1,446,950 254,594 365,875
AIRSG - 1,635,631 - 188,681 65,913 431,788
2011 IRSG 559,020 70,115 - 2,037,268 1,786,844 96,330 642,999
AIRSG - 2,037,268 - 250,424 - 154,094 488,905
2012 IRSG 700,905 89,594 - 1,981,441 1,381,678 497,390 713,684
AIRSG - 1,981,441 - 599,763 - 102,373 611,311
2013 IRSG 816,661 194,036 - 1,771,699 1,172,398 364,416 856,510
AIRSG - 1,771,699 - 598,301 - 233,885 622,625
2014 IRSG 949,609 157,114 - 1,755,646 1,736,008 - 90,498 902,631
AIRSG - 1,755,646 - 19,638 - 110,136 792,495
IRSG interest rate sensitivity gap, AIRSG accumulated interest rate sensitivity gap
Table 10 Influence of interest rate changes (IRC) toward net interest income (NII) of CCB from 2009 to 2014 (million RMB)
At the end of B 3 months 3 month deposit/loan IRC next
year
3 months to
1 year
1 year deposit/loan IRC next
year
NII change next
year
2008
TA 2,056,973 0.99 2,155,231 1.35 - 2,180,958
TL 3,593,476 1.53 1,005,497 1.62
2009
TA 2,775,699 - 1.71 2,224,761 - 2.16 4866.21
TL 4,622,373 - 1.62 1,089,322 - 1.89
2010
TA 3,230,960 0.00 2,985,034 0.00 0.00
TL 4,866,591 0.00 1,535,084 0.00
2011
TA 4,477,879 0.49 3,532,346 0.50 - 430,596
TL 6,515,147 0.54 1,745,502 0.50
2012
TA 5,430,809 0.75 3,357,890 0.75 - 1,191,047
TL 7,412,250 0.85 1,986,212 0.75
2013
TA 6,404,546 - 0.50 3,318,981 - 0.56 100,011
TL 8,175,245 - 0.50 2,146,583 - 0.50
TA total assets, TL total liabilities
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One finds, from Eq. (4), D = 0.125.
From Eq. (9), one has.
Dgap  0:0024
and from Eq. (10)
DV ’ 28; 691:67:
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